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Abstract—This paper studies the physical (PHY)-layer secu-
rity performance in full-duplex (FD) multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) small-cell networks. Here, we take into account
(i) residual self-interference (SI) over Rician fading channels,
and (ii) mutual-interference (MI) under successive interference
cancellation (SIC) mechanism. Considering linear zero-forcing
(ZF) beamforming, the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) average
secrecy rates under both scenarios of passive and colluding
eavesdropping are derived. Our findings indicate that the FD
functionality can provide substantial improvements in the PHY-
layer security performance, especially with the aid of MIMO
communications and interference cancellation solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Full-duplex (FD) communications is an emerging disruptive
solution for improving the achievable spectral efficiency (SE)
[1]. This trend is in line with the recent major breakthroughs
in self-interference (SI) cancellation [2], [3]. Moreover, the
mutual-interference (MI), a main limiting factor in large-
scale FD systems, can be tackled via successive interference
cancellation (SIC) [4]. With the aid of state-of-the-art schemes
for tackling SI and MI, significant FD versus half-duplex (HD)
SE gains can be achieved in cellular networks [5], [6].
Physical (PHY)-layer security is a de facto requirement for
the safeguarding of future wireless communications systems
[7]. This topic has received a great deal of attention in recent
years (see, e.g., [8] and the references therein for a survey).
Given that the locations of the eavesdroppers (EDs) are in
general not known to the cellular network operator, they can
be modeled using point processes, see, e.g., [9]. More recently,
the impact of randomly-located cooperating (i.e., colluding)
EDs has also been investigated in [10].
In [11], a new solution for improving the secrecy capacity
using FD transceivers which perform joint reception and
jamming was proposed. The work in [11], as well as other
related papers such as [12], were based on a deterministic
single-cell setup. On the other hand, the PHY-layer security
performance in large-scale FD systems is not well understood.
In this work, we aim to bridge the gap by providing an
analysis of average secrecy rate performance in FD multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) small-cell networks.
Here, we employ the Poisson point process (PPP)-based
abstraction model of multi-antenna base stations (BSs), user
equipments (UEs), and EDs. The residual SI channels follow
from the Rician distribution with arbitrary statistics. We con-
sider SIC mechanism at the UE side, via imposing an arbitrary
radius guard region in the respective MI expression. By lever-
aging on the tools from stochastic geometry, we characterize
the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) average secrecy rates and
derive the statistics of the different useful and interference
signals in closed-form. The validity of the theoretical findings
is confirmed through Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations.
Notation: X is a matrix; x is a vector; T , †, and +
are the transpose, Hermitian, and pseudo-inverse; Ex[.] is the
expectation; Pr[.] is the probability; Fx[.] is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF); Px[.] is the probability density
function (PDF); Lx[.] is the Laplace transform (LT) function;
[x]
+
= max(x, 0) is the Ramp function; I(.) is the identity
matrix; CN (µ, ν2) is the complex Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and variance ν2; Γ(.) and Γ(., .) are the Gamma
and incomplete Gamma functions; G(κ, θ) is the Gamma
distribution with shape parameter κ and scale parameter θ;
and 2F1(., .; .; .) is the Gauss hypergeometric function.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a large-scale multi-user MIMO small-cell network
where the FD BSs and half-duplex (HD) UEs are deployed
based on PPPs φd and φu with densities λd and λu, respec-
tively. Each FD small-cell BS, equipped with Nd transmit and
Nu receive antennas, is considered to simultaneously serve Kd
DL and Ku UL HD single-antenna UEs per resource block.
Moreover, the EDs are modeled according to a homogeneous
PPP φe with spatial density λe. Moreover, we consider the
different scenarios where the (single-antenna) EDs are operat-
ing independently and cooperatively. Note that with obvious
adjustments, the HD system, where the DL and UL occur over
different resource blocks, can be described.
By invoking the Slivnyak’s theorem, we perform the DL
analysis for a typical HD UE o located at the center. Let
l ∈ φd, k ∈ φu, and j ∈ φe denote the locations of
the BS l, UL UE k, and ED j, respectively. We consider
the cellular association strategy based on the maximum re-
ceived signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). Mathe-
matically, the tagged BS of the reference DL UE o satisfies
b = arg min(rl,o), l ∈ φd, where rl,o = ‖l − o‖ denotes
the Euclidean distance. The UL analysis, is carried out at
the tagged BS b with respect to the signal of an arbitrary
HD UL UE i. Due to the cellular association procedure, the
scheduled UEs locations are interdependent. Conditioning on
the spatial constraints, we assume that the scheduled UEs
follow from a homogeneous PPP [13]. Further, we consider the
most malicious EDs in the DL and UL, respectively denoted
with v and c, which receive the strongest SINRs.
Let pd and pu denote the (per-user) BS and UE transmit
powers, respectively. The DL channel gains from the BS l
at the UE k and ED j are gl,k ∈ C1·Nd and gl,j ∈ C1·Nd ,
respectively. We denote the UL channel gains from the UE
k at the BS l and ED j using hk,l ∈ CNu·1 and hk,j ,
respectively. The cross-mode channel gains from the BS l
at the BS b, and from the UE k at the UE o are denoted
with Hl,b ∈ CNu·Nd and gk,o, respectively. The residual SI
channel gain at the BS b is denoted with Hb,b ∈ CNu·Nd . The
residual SI channels are Rician distributed with independent
and indentically distributed (iid.) CN (µ, ν2) coefficients [14].
All other channels are considered to be Rayleigh distributed
with iid. elements drawn from CN (0, 1). In addition, we utilize
the unbounded path-loss model with exponent α (> 2).
We employ linear zero-forcing (ZF) beamforming for sup-
pressing intra-cell interference in both the DL and the UL.
Let Gl = [gTl,k]
T
1≤k≤Kd ∈ CKd·Nd denote the collective DL
channels from the BS l to its Kd DL UEs. At the BS l, the
linear ZF precoding matrix Vl is selected equal to the normal-
ized columns of G+l = G
†
l (GlG
†
l )
−1 ∈ CNd·Kd . Moreover,
let Hl = [hk,l]1≤k≤Ku ∈ CNu·Ku represent the collective UL
channels at the BS l from its Ku scheduled UL UEs. At the
BS l, the linear postcoding ZF matrix Wl is selected equal to
the normalized rows of H+l = (H
†
lHl)
−1H†l ∈ CKu·Nu .
The received SINR in the DL at the UE o is given by
γFDo =
Xo
Id,do + I
u,d
o + σ2o
(1)
where Xo = pdGb,or−αb,o , I
d,d
o =
∑
l∈φd\{b} pdGl,or
−α
l,o ,
Iu,do =
∑
k∈φu puGk,or
−α
k,o , and σ
2
o is the noise variance.
Under linear ZF precoding, it can be shown that Gb,o ∼
G(Nd − Kd + 1, 1). With the assumption that the other
BSs precoding matrices have independent columns, we have
Gl,o ∼ G(Kd, 1). Moreover, Gk,o ∼ G(1, 1).
On the other hand, the SINR in the UL at the BS b with
respect to the signal from an arbitrary UL UE i is given by
γFDi =
Xi
Iu,ui + I
d,u
i + I
i
i + σ
2
i
(2)
where Xi = puHi,br−αi,b , I
u,u
i =
∑
k∈φˆu puHk,br
−α
k,b , I
d,u
i =∑
l∈φd\{b} pdHl,br
−α
l,b , I
i
i = pbHb,b, φˆu denotes the set of
outer-cell scheduled UL UEs, and σ2i is the noise variance.
Considering linear ZF postcoding, Hi,b ∼ G(Nu−Ku+1, 1).
In addition, Hk,b ∼ G(1, 1), and via recalling the assumption
of independent (column-wise) outer-cell precoding matrices,
Hl,b ∼ G(Kd, 1). Furthermore, the residual SI channel power
gain over the MIMO Rician fading channel can be approxi-
mated as Hb,b ∼ G(κ, θ) where (3) and (4) [14].
We can define the SINR in the DL at the most malicious
ED v as
γFDv =
Xv
Id,dv + I
u,d
v + σ2v
(5)
where Xv = pdGb,vr−αb,v , I
d,d
v =
∑
l∈φd\{b} pdGl,vr
−α
l,v ,
Iu,dv =
∑
k∈φu puGk,vr
−α
k,v , and σ
2
v is the noise variance.
The channel power gains are given by Gb,v ∼ G(1, 1),
Gl,v ∼ G(Kd, 1), and Gk,v ∼ G(1, 1).
Further, the SINR in the UL at the most malicious ED c is
given by
γFDc =
Xc
Iu,uc + I
d,u
c + σ2c
(6)
where Xc = puHo,cr−αo,c , I
u,u
c =
∑
k∈φu puHk,cr
−α
k,c , I
d,u
c =∑
l∈φd pdHl,cr
−α
l,c , and σ
2
c is the noise variance. Here, the
channel power gains are characterized using Ho,c ∼ G(1, 1),
Hk,c ∼ G(1, 1), and Hl,c ∼ G(Kd, 1).
III. SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the PHY-layer security perfor-
mance in FD multi-user MIMO small-cell networks under both
scenarios of passive and colluding eavesdropping. Note that
the average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the reference DL and UL
UEs, o and i, over two resource blocks, are denoted with
CFDo and C
FD
i in FD mode, and C
HD
o and C
HD
i in HD mode,
respectively. Similarly, the average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious DL and UL EDs, v and c, over two resource blocks,
are denoted with CFDv and C
FD
c in FD mode, and C
HD
v and C
HD
c
in HD mode, respectively.
Remark 1. By invoking the Jensen’s inequality,
E[max(X,Y )} ≥ max{E{X},E{Y }], the bounded DL
and UL average secrecy rates (considering FD BSs)
are respectively given by SFDo = [C
FD
o − CFDv ]+ and
SFDi = [C
FD
i −CFDc ]+. Similarly, in the case of HD operation,
the bounded DL and UL average secrecy rates are respectively
given by SHDo = [C
HD
o − CHDv ]+ and SHDi = [CHDi − CHDc ]+.
We proceed by deriving explicit expressions for the DL and
UL UEs average rates under linear ZF beamforming. Note that
the proofs are omitted due to space limitations.
κ ,
Kd(Nu + 1) (Nd −Kd + 2)
(
µ2 + ν2
)2(
2NuNd +
Kd(Nd−Kd+2)
Nu+1
(NuNd −Nu −Nd − 1)
)
µ4 + (Nu + 1)(Nd + 1)ν2 (2µ2 + ν2)
(3)
θ ,
(
2NuNd +
Kd(Nd−Kd+2)
(Nd+1)
(NuNd −Nu −Nd − 1)
)
µ4 + (Nu + 1)(Nd + 1)ν
2
(
2µ2 + ν2
)
(Nu + 1) (Nd −Kd + 2) (µ2 + ν2) (4)
Theorem 1. The DL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful
UE o in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are given by
CFDo =
4piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nd−Kd∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
e−sσ
2
o
·LId,do [s]LIu,do [s]
}
s= γr
α
pd
)
dγ re−piλdr
2
dr (7)
CHDo =
2piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nd−Kd∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
e−sσ
2
o
·LId,do [s]
}
s= γr
α
pd
)
dγ re−piλdr
2
dr (8)
LId,do [s] = e
−piλdr2( 2F1(Kd,− 2α ;1− 2α ;−
spd
rα )−1) (9)
LIu,do [s] = e
−piKuλdε2( 2F1(1,− 2α ;1− 2α ;− spuεα )−1). (10)
Remark 2. The guard region radius ε in the MI expression
in (10) can be set according to the SIC mechanism at the UE
side. In particular, ε = 0 corresponds to the worst-case without
SIC capability.
Theorem 2. The UL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful
UE i in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are given by
CFDi =
4piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nu−Ku∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
e−sσ
2
i
·LIu,ui [s]LId,ui [s]LIii [s]
}
s= γr
α
pu
)
dγ re−piλdr
2
dr
(11)
CHDi =
2piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nu−Ku∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
e−sσ
2
i
·LIu,ui [s]
}
s= γr
α
pu
)
dγ re−piλdr
2
dr (12)
LIu,ui [s] = e
−piKuλdr2( 2F1(1,− 2α ;1− 2α ;− spurα )−1) (13)
LId,ui
[s] = e
−piλd(spd)
2
α
Γ(1− 2α )Γ(Kd+ 2α )
Γ(Kd) (14)
LIii [s] = (1 + spdθ)
−κ
. (15)
Remark 3. The Rician fading distribution parameters µ and
ν in the residual SI expression in (15) can be tuned by design
or measurements to capture the SI cancellation capability at the
BS side. For example, ν = 0 and µ = 0 correspond to perfect
SI removal and non line-of-sight (NLOS) SI, respectively.
Remark 4. The derivatives of the interfering terms LT
functions required for the calculation of the average rates in
the Theorems 1-2 can be readily computed through applying
the Faa` di Bruno’s formula.
Next, we derive explicit expressions for the average rates
of the most malicious passive EDs. Note that in this case the
EDs act independently (do not exchange information).
Theorem 3. The DL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious passive ED v in the FD and HD small-cell networks
over two resource blocks are given by
CFDv =
2
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
·
(
1− e
−2piλe
∫∞
0
[
e−sσ
2
vL
I
d,d
v
[s]L
I
u,d
v
[s]
]
s=
γrα
pd
r dr
)
dγ
(16)
CHDv =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
·
(
1− e
−2piλe
∫∞
0
[
e−sσ
2
vL
I
d,d
v
[s]
]
s=
γrα
pd
r dr
)
dγ
(17)
LId,dv [s] = e
−piλd(spd)
2
α
Γ(1− 2α )Γ(Kd+ 2α )
Γ(Kd) (18)
LIu,dv [s] = e
−piKuλd(spu)
2
α Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α ). (19)
Theorem 4. The UL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious passive ED c in the FD and HD small-cell networks
over two resource blocks are given by
CFDc =
2
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
·
(
1− e
−2piλe
∫∞
0
{
e−sσ
2
cLIu,uc
[s]L
I
d,u
c
[s]
}
s=
γrα
pu
r dr
)
dγ
(20)
CHDc =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
·
(
1− e
−2piλe
∫∞
0
{
e−sσ
2
cLIu,uc
[s]
}
s=
γrα
pu
r dr
)
dγ
(21)
LIu,uc [s] = e
−piKuλd(spu)
2
α Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α ) (22)
LId,uc [s] = e
−piλd(spd)
2
α
Γ(1− 2α )Γ(Kd+ 2α )
Γ(Kd) . (23)
The average rates of the most malicious colluding EDs in
the DL and UL are derived next. The cooperating EDs in this
case form a distributed antenna system [10].
Theorem 5. The DL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious colluding ED v in the FD and HD small-cell
networks over two resource blocks are given by
CFDv ≤
4piλepd
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
e−sσ
2
v
·LId,dv [s]LIu,dv [s] ds dr dγ (24)
CHDv ≤
2piλepd
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
e−sσ
2
v
·LId,dv [s] ds dr dγ. (25)
Theorem 6. The UL average rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious colluding ED c in the FD and HD small-cell
networks over two resource blocks are given by
CFDc ≤
4piλepu
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
e−sσ
2
c
·LIu,uc [s]LId,uc [s] ds dr dγ (26)
CHDc ≤
2piλepu
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
e−sσ
2
c
·LIu,uc [s] ds dr dγ. (27)
Remark 5. The parameter r0 in the colluding EDs average
rates from Theorems 5-6 represents the guard region distance
required to satisfy the secrecy non-outage condition.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assess the PHY-layer security performance of FD and
HD MIMO small-cell networks in the presence of a Pois-
son field of EDs. The small-cell BS deployment density is
λ(d) = 4pi per km
2. The (per-user) BS and UE transmit powers
are pd = 23 dBm and pu = 20 dBm, respectively. The
noise spectral density at all receivers is −170 dBm/Hz and the
system bandwidth is W = 10 MHz. The path-loss exponent
is α = 4. In the FD small-cell network, the DL and UL run
simultaneously (with SIC and SI cancellation), whereas in the
HD small-cell network, the DL and UL occur over different
resource blocks. Note that all results correspond to the per-user
average secrecy rate performance over two resource blocks.
A. Impact of the Number of Base Station Antennas
1) Passive Eavesdroppers: The impact of the number of
BS antennas on the small-cell network PHY-layer security
performance under passive eavesdropping is depicted in Fig.
1. It can be seen that the average secrecy rate increases in
the number of antennas. Furthermore, the FD over HD small-
cell network PHY-layer security performance gain increases
in the number of antennas. In point of fact, even with SIC
mechanism and perfect SI suppression, only negligible FD
versus HD improvements in average secrecy performance can
be achieved when the small-cell BSs are equipped with a few
antennas. This trend highlights the essential role of MIMO in
harnessing the full potential of FD technology.
2) Colluding Eavesdroppers: The impact of the number of
BS antennas on the small-cell network PHY-layer security
performance under colluding eavesdropping is depicted in
Fig. 2. Similar to the case of passive EDs, increasing the
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number of antennas always results in higher average secrecy
rates, as well as greater FD versus HD PHY-layer security
performance gains. Furthermore, our findings indicate that
the relative FD versus HD average secrecy rate gain can be
considerably higher in the case of colluding EDs. The reason
is because each cooperative ED experiences added interference
(i.e., MI) in the case of FD operation which in turn degrades
the colluding EDs’ combined SINR.
B. Impact of the Eavesdropper Density
1) Passive Eavesdroppers: The impact of the ED spatial
density on the small-cell network PHY-layer security perfor-
mance under passive eavesdropping is depicted in Fig. 3. As
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expected, it can be seen that the average secrecy rate decreases
in the ratio of ED over BS deployment densities. Moreover, in-
creasing the spatial density of the EDs decreases the FD versus
HD small-cell network PHY-layer security performance gain.
This is because the stronger ED channel capacity degrades
the average secrecy rate values, which in turn, reduces the
gap between the PHY-layer security performance in the FD
and HD small-cell networks.
2) Colluding Eavesdroppers: The impact of the ED spatial
density on the small-cell network PHY-layer security perfor-
mance under colluding eavesdropping is depicted in Fig. 4. We
can observe similar trends to those highlighted in the case of
passive EDs. Intuitively, the PHY-layer security performance
benefits from having a smaller ED PPP-based deployment
density. Furthermore, the underlying FD versus HD gains in
terms of average secrecy rate increases with smaller values
of λe. Note that the case of collusion represents the absolute
worst-case scenario in terms of secrecy capacity. Therefore,
unless the ED spatial density is very small, the small-cell
network experiences secrecy outage with a high probability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the PHY-layer security performance in large-
scale FD multi-user MIMO small-cell networks. By leveraging
on the tools from applied probability theory, we derived
explicit expressions for the average secrecy rates under differ-
ent passive and colluding eavesdropping scenarios. The find-
ings highlighted that significant improvements in PHY-layer
security performance can be achieved through FD enabled
BSs, particularly, with the aid of MIMO communications and
interference cancellation solutions.
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